Abstract: This paper builds an integrated framework of measures of information based on the Model for Information (MfI) developed by the author. Since truth is expressed using information, an analysis of truth depends on the nature of information and its limitations. These limitations include those implied by the geometry of information and those implied by the relativity of information. This paper proposes an approach to truth and truthlikeness that takes these limitations into account by incorporating measures of the quality of information. Another measure of information is the amount of information. This has played a role in two important theoretical difficulties-the Bar-Hillel Carnap paradox and the "scandal of deduction". This paper further provides an analysis of the amount of information, based on MfI, and shows how the MfI approach can resolve these difficulties.
Introduction
This paper uses the Model for Information (MfI) defined in [1] to provide an integrated approach to measures of information like truth, truthlikeness and the "amount" of information. The measures use the ideas about information quality and the geometry of information developed in [1] .
Section 2 summarises some of the key ideas in MfI. Information-processing entities that exchange information through interaction are called Interacting Entities (IEs). The information they exchange is in the form of Information Artefacts (IAs) in the form of speech, documents, gestures, alarm calls, computer messages and so forth. In the natural world, evolution has driven the creation of numerous ecosystems. A similar situation exists with respect to information-a range of selection processes has OPEN ACCESS created Information Ecosystems (known as just Ecosystems where the context is clear) that incorporate a set of conventions applying to relevant IEs and what they are communicating.
One of the key concepts underpinning MfI is information quality (IQ) and the measures associated with it. Section 3 analyses some of the factors involved in IQ including recognition connection strategy (the varying strategies an IE can take to interpret an IA) and derivation (how the quality of an IA can be affected by the history of its components).
This sets the scene for Section 4 in which the measures used in [1] are refined. The core measures are combined in a number of ways to produce measures of the amount of information, the "useful" amount of information (combining quality with the amount) and reliability of plausibility (combining quality with plausibility).
With these measures in place, Section 5 looks at truth and truthlikeness starting with Floridi's question "can information explain truth?" (listed as question P6 in [2] ). In particular, truth is expressed using IAs, and IAs are interpreted by IEs. So, truth (for an IE) is related to both an IA and its interpretation and the nature of truth cannot be disentangled from the quality of information. There are several limitations implied by this, including the following:
 evidence from psychology indicates that humans have inherent difficulties in interpreting information;  information has a geometry that constrains the possible approaches to truth;  the interpretation of truth, like all concepts, is Ecosystem-dependent so we should expect different approaches to truth in different Ecosystems.
With this context, the measures of information described in Section 4 are applied to truth using the extract from the legal oath "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" and the analysis is extended to truthlikeness. The amount of information has played a role in two important theoretical difficulties-the Bar-Hillel Carnap paradox [3] and the "scandal of deduction" [4] . Section 6 provides an analysis of the amount of information, based on MfI and the measures of Section 4, and shows how the MfI approach can resolve these difficulties.
Summary of the Model for Information (MfI)
This section contains a brief overview of the main ideas of MfI discussed in [1] . These ideas are used throughout the rest of this paper. MfI integrates evolutionary, dynamic and static views of information, highlights the connection between physical processes and symbolic content and shows how information expresses connections between different elements of the physical world.
Based on ideas from computer systems modelling, MfI incorporates both the functional attributes of systems (the behaviour of a system) and non-functional (the qualities of a system-like performance, availability, scalability, maintainability). Within MfI, non-functional attributes correspond to information quality (IQ) and information friction (IF). Consideration of IQ poses the question: quality with respect to what? There are two important dimensions. If x is an IA we can ask the following questions:
 how well does x represent what it is intended to represent?  how useful is x in what an IE needs to achieve?
Call the answer to the first of these intrinsic IQ and the second action IQ.
IF is a measure of the resources needed for some information-related task-it measures the opposite of efficiency. Reductions in IF are responsible for the majority of technological improvements associated with information.
Call a slice a contiguous subset of space-time. A slice can correspond to an entity at a point in time (or more properly within a very short interval of time), a fixed piece of space over a fixed period of time or, much more generally, an event that moves through space and time. This definition allows great flexibility in discussing information. By using slices rather than space and time separately we can apply a common approach. For example, slices are sufficiently general to support a common discussion of nouns and verbs, the past and the future.
We also use the following to describe the physical world:
 properties: each slice has a set of properties and for each property there is one or more physical processes (called measurement) that takes the slice as input and generates the value of the property for the slice;  entity: a type of slice corresponding to a substance;  interaction: a physical process that relates the properties of two entities.
As Floridi discusses in [2] , abstraction is concerned with leaving out detail. [1] uses the term "pattern" for this (linked to the usage in the computer systems architecture world (e.g., [5] ) rather than the sense in which is it used by Burgin in [6] ). In this paper we use the term abstraction pattern for the same thing (to clarify the relationship with abstraction).
MfI includes a generic model for IEs that incorporates different types of memory. Humans have semantic memory and episodic memory [7] . Computer databases include symbolic records and also binary large objects (things like media files). For IEs in general we use the terms symbolic memory and event memory to distinguish between these two types. In addition, IEs have working memory where connections are made in response to interactions.
In the natural world, evolution has driven the creation of numerous ecosystems. A similar situation exists with respect to information and a range of selection processes. English speakers can communicate in English with each other but not always to non-English speakers. Healthcare computer systems exchange information using healthcare system protocols that cannot be interpreted by other systems. Mathematicians can communicate with each other in a form that is incomprehensible to non-mathematicians. In each case there is a set of conventions that apply to relevant IEs and what they are communicating. The scope of these conventions includes:
 the symbols that are used;  the structure of IAs and the rules that apply to them;  the ways in which concepts are connected;  the ways in which IAs are created and parsed (embodying the rules for creating any compatible IA);  the channels that are used to interact.
Each of these elements co-evolves with the others. There are abstraction patterns for each of these.
Call such a set of conventions a Modelling Tool (MT). We can define an Information Ecosystem (just Ecosystem where there is no ambiguity) to be the set of IEs, IAs and channel abstraction patterns that support a particular Modelling Tool. (Of course, a particular Ecosystem may be a subset of other Ecosystems and any given IE may support various Modelling Tools.)
IAs are constructed from symbols. A symbol abstraction pattern is a set of slice abstraction patterns for which there are corresponding Ecosystem process abstraction patterns that enable the symbols to be used interchangeably by the IEs within an Ecosystem.
Interpretation and Connection Strategy
Information quality (IQ) plays a major role in the discussion of different measures below. In this section we consider the different factors that impact the IQ of the interpretation of an IA or of the IA in itself.
Connection Strategy
In order to make an interpretation, an IE has to recognise the content in an IA by connecting it to what is in memory. The interpretation depends critically on the connections stored in working memory and their links to other memories. In making these connections there may be many options. A selection from these options forms the (recognition) connection strategy, shown in Figure 1 . (Although it is concerned with recognition, since no other connection strategies are discussed in this paper it is known as the connection strategy in the rest of the paper.) any kind of quality threshold that must be met?
The result of the connection strategy is a set of connected content in working memory with further connections into memory (references to Ecosystem content and the environment are stored in content and event memory). The connection strategy trades off IQ and IF (see [1] ). Figure 2 shows the range of possibilities for each factor of the connection strategy shown in Figure 1 . When processing an IA the minimum sensible search space is that containing the content in the IA. At the other extreme, a thorough search will also consider much more. So, a computer query may just search for the string "John" but a person may also consider other stored attributes of various Johns (second name, address, whereabouts etc.) that may be relevant to the search. The search space also depends on the Modelling Tool in use. A particular Modelling Tool (e.g., Mathematics) may naturally limit the search space to connections directly concerned with the Modelling Tool.
The option factor is straightforward-does the IE just accept the first match, or require several, or all. The success threshold defines what constitutes a match-is there a quality standard that needs to be met in terms of the nature of the connections or related to derivation. This is clearly related to Action IQ. An element of the success threshold is coherence. The importance of coherence for an IE is clear-without a coherent interpretation of the environment it will not be possible effectively to evaluate courses of action (and their potential relationship with outcomes). In [8] , Kahneman describes how "associative memory, …, continually constructs a coherent interpretation of what is going on in our world at any instant". As Kahneman makes clear, coherence is not necessarily linked to other aspects of quality.
The ability to recognise and make connections is clearly important to humans, animals and computers. At an organisational level, the importance is captured in the title of [9] -"If only HP knew what HP knows".
A limited connection strategy may be less reliable, but given the combinatorial difficulties of more extensive strategies, may be much more efficient to implement. The connection strategy factors demonstrate the scale of the combinatorial problem-the more thorough the search the greater the level of resources needed. So, it is natural that selection processes have resulted in a trade-off between As a result, we cannot reliably trust our System 1 (but often do so without realising it). Systems 1 and 2 provide examples of generic connection strategies for humans-we can call them connection strategy abstraction patterns. System design and programming define connection strategies for computer programs. In general, elements of the connection strategy will be defined or constrained by:
 the abstraction pattern of an IE (e.g., DNA, system architecture);  the history of interactions of an IE (e.g., education, market success);  the elements of an IA.
Connection strategy defines how much resource to apply and how good the answer needs to be (although neither of these may be apparent to the IE). So it is one of the key outcomes of selection processes.
Connection strategy is complicated, sometimes well hidden and has a major impact on IQ, so it makes sense that different Ecosystems have developed different approaches to assessing its effectiveness. Consider, for example:
 questions and answers (in conversation);  cross-examination (in the legal process);  peer review (in the academic world);  thought and introspection.
These help answer the question: what level of IQ is appropriate for an Ecosystem?
But can we assume that the particular Modelling Tool corresponding to an Ecosystem is the most appropriate for providing the levels of IQ needed by the Ecosystem? The invention of Mathematics and, more recently, computer modelling suggests that the answer is "no" in some cases but outside a few Ecosystems the question is not necessarily addressed. Figure 3 shows the overall process by which an IA is derived. The whole process may be extremely complicated and may cross Ecosystem boundaries many times (e.g., between people and computers). There are many ways in which quality may degrade and different Ecosystems have devised different ways of dealing with it. For example:
Derivation
 in IT, there are rigorous processes for designing, building and testing systems [10] -ensuring that the subsequent derivation of information is robust;  in legal processes there are rules for handling evidence so that information presented in court has a reliable derivation;  scientists pay considerable attention to the design of experiments so that measurement is as reliable as possible.
Other types of Ecosystem may be less scrupulous.
Measures
In this section we define the various measures related to different types of content. First a review of some definitions, mostly drawn from [1] .
Definitions

Content in Modelling Tools is of the following types:
 atom: the fundamental indivisible level of content in the Modelling Tool (note that this definition is different from the definition of "atom" in [11] );  chunk: groups of atoms;  assertion: the smallest piece of content that is a piece of information-containing two chunks in a manner that conforms to an assertion abstraction pattern;  passage: a related sequence of assertions.
For the sections below and using the definitions established in [1] , suppose that:
M is a Modelling Tool (and all of the subsequent definitions are with respect to M); ΓΜ is the set of content in M; ΓγΜ is the set of chunk content in M and γ, δ ∈ ΓγΜ;
ΓαΜ is the set of assertion content in M and α, β ∈ ΓαΜ where α = (γ, ρ, δ) and ρ is an assertion abstraction pattern;
ΓπΜ is the set of passage content in M and π ∈ ΓπΜ; Ξ is the set of set theoretic relationships; Σ is the set of all slices;
T is a set of discrete times and t ∈ T;
, is a chunk interpretation; Φγ is the set of all chunk interpretations (for M);
, is an assertion interpretation; Φα is the set of all assertion interpretations (for M);
, is a passage interpretation where f is a Boolean expression (containing ANDs); Φπ is the set of all passage interpretations (for M); φeγ, φeα, φeπ are the corresponding the Ecosystem interpretations.
Chunks, Assertions, Passages and Interpretations
Chunks and assertions are different kinds of content. Chunks specify constraints and assertions make hypotheses about the relationship between different constraints. The interpretations of chunks correspond to sets created using the following operators to create the constraints: ∩, ∪, \, The definition of interpretations in Section 4.1 is general but we are only interested in interpretations that correspond to an IE or Ecosystem. From now on the term interpretation will be restricted to just that: interpretation by an IE or Ecosystem. Any IE, at any time, will have a unique interpretation of any chunk, assertion or passage.
There are relationships between the different types of assertion. Any assertion interpretation induces two chunk interpretations. But note that the assertion provides a context for the chunks that may change the chunk interpretations. An example is provided by the psychological biases that Kahneman refers to in [8] . For passages, the situation is more complex. The same chunk may occur more than once and be interpreted in different ways each time. This is the issue addressed by the measure "precision" addressed below.
Interpretations may not be well behaved. In the most general case an interpretation may be unrelated to the structure of an assertion or passage (as implied by the Modelling Tool). For example, the interpretation of some French by someone who does not understand French grammar may be well wide of the mark. In general, selection pressures will drive IE interpretations towards that of the Ecosystem. So we want to consider interpretations that are close, in some sense, to the Ecosystem interpretation and that respect the following structures and Ecosystem behaviour of the Modelling Tool:
 the relations implicit in the assertion;  synonyms (i.e., chunks for which the interpretation is the same);  discrimination (i.e., chunks for which the interpretation is different).
In each case we have to allow the actual interpretations to be different, but we want the structure to remain the same. So, if φ is a passage interpretation, which induces corresponding chunk and assertion interpretations, define:
the φ-closure of γ, σφ(γ) = {δ ∈ ΓγΜ: φ (δ, t) = φ (γ, t)}; the closure of γ, σ(γ) = {δ ∈ ΓγΜ: φe (δ, t) = φe (γ, t)};
and say that
φ is MT-structured if φ maps to the same relation as φe for all passages; φ is MT-consistent if φ is MT-closed and MT-structured.
Boolean Passages
Suppose that α and β are assertions. Consider the statements:
It may not be possible for an IE to interpret them in the manner described above-depending on the IE they do not necessarily correspond to the satisfaction of one or more constraints (although an IE may process them as if they were). In some sense there is information missing. If α and β refer to the same chunk (as in "the cat was black" OR "the cat was grey") then they correspond to a single assertion ("the cat was black or grey"). But in the most general case ("the cat was black" OR "the dog was old") this is not possible. They are clearly useful in terms of selection processes both with respect to the current environment state (e.g., "there is a gust of wind over there or a large animal is moving the grass") or outcomes (e.g., "if it is a large animal then I am in danger"). An IE may have access to the "missing" information in memory but it makes sense to distinguish between recognition and assessment [1] . Recognition is about interpreting the environment state on its own; assessment is about combining that interpretation with other information in memory to decide what action to take. For the purposes of this paper interpretation is concerned with recognition.
Within MfI there are two ways to address such statements depending on whether we are dealing with one Modelling Tool or two. Assume first of all that the Boolean operators are part of the same Modelling Tool as the assertions. Define a Boolean passage to include such statements. As with a passage, we can say that interpretation of a Boolean passage corresponds to Boolean expression of interpretations of assertions (with the caveat that the interpretation of chunks may vary throughout the Boolean expression). Each assertion and passage is a Boolean passage. Call the set of Boolean passages ΓβΜ. Now suppose we are dealing with two Modelling Tools: one (M1) for the assertions (perhaps a language) and another (M2) that includes the Boolean operations and Boolean expressions. Such an IA is described as a Composite IA [1] . In this case, the complexity raised above does not arise. In M2, the chunks are M1 assertions (as in "IF P AND Q THEN R" in which P, Q and R are chunks for M2). In this case, there is a chance that the two Modelling Tools are interpreted independently and the results combined separately. This distinction corresponds to a question raised by Popper in [12] that is discussed in Section 5. In terms of the connection strategy discussed above, the search space may well be different if two Modelling Tools are involved rather than just one.
This discussion shows how the model can be extended to non-Boolean passages. Suppose Mn is a set of Modelling Tools that support a range of non-Boolean operations and expressions. Composite IAs produced from Mn will allow different overall interpretations depending on the degree to which the interpretations from the different Modelling Tools are combined (or not
We can extend the definitions of MT-structured and MT-consistent to the interpretations of Boolean passages in the obvious way. For the rest of the paper, unless otherwise notified, it is assumed that all interpretations are MT-consistent.
Measures for Chunks-Accuracy
At any given time, chunk interpretations map chunk content to a subset of slices as shown in Assume that φe is the Ecosystem interpretation and φ, φ ' are chunk interpretations. For chunks, we can define the following: φ is γ-accurate (with respect to t) if φ (γ, t) = φe (γ, t) ≠ ∅; φ is γ-inaccurate (with respect to t) if φ (γ, t) ∩ φe (λ, t) = ∅ ; φ is more γ-⊂ -accurate than φ' (with respect to t) if φ' (γ, t) ⊂ φ (γ, t) ⊆ φe (γ, t); φ is more γ-⊃ -accurate than φ' (with respect to t) if φe (γ, t) ⊆ φ (γ, t) ⊂ φ' (γ, t); φ is more γ-accurate than φ' (with respect to t) if it is more γ-⊂ -accurate or more γ-⊃ -accurate (note that it cannot be both); φ is γ-partially accurate (with respect to t) if φ (γ, t) ∩ φe (λ, t) ≠ ∅ and φ (γ, t) \ φe (λ, t) ≠ ∅ .
The definitions can be extended (and "γ-" removed) by insisting that they apply for all γ ∈ ΓγΜ. Figure 5 shows some of these definitions diagrammatically. We can use these definitions to compare interpretations. Define: φ <acc,t φ' if φ' is more accurate than φ; φ =acc,t φ' if φ = φ'; ≤acc,t, >acc,t , ≥acc,t correspondingly.
≤acc,t is anti-symmetric-suppose that φ < acc,t φ' and φ' ≤acc,t φ; then φ ≠acc,t φ' and there is some γ for which (depending on the type of relative accuracy) either
In either case it cannot be true that φ ' ≤acc,t φ. So ≤acc,t provides a partial order for Φγ for any time t (other partial order requirements are guaranteed by set inclusion). φ is more γ--accurate than φ' (for γ, t).
φ is more γ--accurate than φ' (for γ, t).
φ is γ-partially accurate, φ' is γ-inaccurate (for γ, t).
Measures for Chunks-Precision
Assume that T' ⊆ T is a time interval and that φ is an interpretation that applies at (potentially) multiple times to chunks during T'. Define:
the ∩T'-range of φ with respect to γ, ∩T'-ran (φ, γ) = {σ: σ ∈ φ (γ, t) ∀ t ∈ T'}; the ∪T'-range of φ with respect to γ, ∪T'-ran (φ, γ) = {σ: ∃ t ∈ T' such that σ ∈ φ (γ, t)}; φ is γ-precise (with respect to T') if ∩T'-ran (φ, γ) = ∪T'-ran (φ, γ); φ is γ-imprecise (with respect to T') if ∩T'-ran (φ, γ) = ∅; φ is more γ-precise than φ ' (with respect to T') if
The definitions can be extended (and "γ-" removed) by insisting that they apply for all γ ∈ ΓγΜ. Again we can compare interpretations. Define:
φ <pre,T' φ ' if φ ' is more precise than φ ' for time period T'; φ =pre,T' φ ' if φ = φ ' ; ≤pre,T', >pre,T', ≥pre,T' correspondingly.
≤pre,T' is anti-symmetric because if φ is more γ-precise than φ ' then it cannot be true that φ ' is as γ-precise as φ. So ≤pre,T' is a partial order for Φγ. Precision applies to interpretations of the same content at different times. This may include multiple instances of the same piece of content in the same passage. In this case, as in others, the context may determine that the different interpretations should be different-that, according to the interpretation, they are intended to refer to different sets of slices. In this case, we need to narrow the measures to groups of chunks, i.e., sets of chunks that, according to the Ecosystem conventions that apply to the Modelling Tool, are intended to refer to the same thing. When we apply precision to the interpretation of a Boolean passage, the period T' will (usually) be a very short interval and we can write ≤pre,[t] instead of ≤pre,T'.
Measures for Chunks-Coverage
Coverage is an attribute of the Modelling Tool (note that the definition here is different to the definition in [1] ). Coverage captures the number of properties of slices that are incorporated in a chunk and how tightly the value constrains the property. This relates directly to the syntax of the Modelling Tool. So, for example, "two metre tall, dark-haired man" has more coverage than "tall, dark-haired man" and, in turn, this has more coverage than "tall man". We can define: γ >cov γ' if γ has greater coverage than γ'; ≥cov, ≤cov, <cov correspondingly.
If γ and γ' are synonyms (or the equivalent in other Modelling Tools) then γ ≤cov γ' and γ' ≤cov γ and we cannot deduce that γ = γ'. But if we define the set σ'(γ) = {δ ∈ ΓγΜ: γ ≤cov δ and δ ≤cov γ} then ≤cov is a partial order for Γσ'Μ = {σ'(γ): γ ∈ ΓγΜ}. In this case we clearly have σ'(γ) ⊆ σ(γ). But the definition of exact synonyms is that they are interpreted in the same way so σ᾽(γ) = σ(γ).
Measures for Chunks-Resolution
Greater coverage provides the potential to discriminate between alternative environment states. Resolution measures the extent to which the interpretation supports discrimination. Say that φ resolves as well as φ ' (with respect to t) if for all γ ∈ ΓγΜ, φ (γ, t) ⊆ φ ' (γ, t); (note that this is a different definition from that in [1] but it expresses the concept more clearly). 
Define:
φ ≤res,t φ ' if φ resolves as well as φ ' (for t);
≥res,t, <res,t, >res,t correspondingly.
Then, ≤res,t is a partial order for Φγ. (As before, by insisting that resolution applies to all chunks we can guarantee that ≤res,t is anti-symmetric.)
Measures for Chunks-Timeliness
Timeliness is a measure of a different type. It measures the difference between the time of measurement of properties and the time of interpretation. In this case it is a total order that is independent of content and interpretation and that we can call ≤tim.
Measures for Chunks-Overall
Partial orders can be combined in a number of ways to create further partial orders, but there are two specific mechanisms of interest here: sum and product. Suppose that A and B are disjoint sets, ≤a1 and ≤a2 are partial orders on A, ≤b is a partial order on B and C = A × B. Define: a ≤a a' if a ≤a1 a' and a ≤a2 a' for a, a' ∈ A; c ≤c c' if a ≤a1 a' and b ≤b b' for c = (a, b), c' = (a', b'), a, a' ∈ A, b, b' ∈ B.
If this is true for all γ, then φ resolves better than φ'.
Then ≤a is the sum of ≤a1 and ≤a2 and ≤c is the product of ≤a1 and ≤b and both are partial orders. Table 1 lists the orders described above and some combinations. Fixed t ΓσΦγ = Γσ × Φγ ≤cq,t measures the quality of the interpretation of a chunk. ≤ci,t measures both the coverage of a chunk (≤cov) and how much of that potential has been converted in the interpretation (≤res,t).
Measures for Assertions
The quality of assertions depends both on the quality of the relevant chunks and the quality of the relation with respect to the chunk interpretations. In that sense, an assertion is a hypothesis that different interpretations may confirm or refute. So assume that α = (γ, ρ, δ) is an assertion and φ (α, t) = (φ (γ, t), r, φ (δ, t)).
We can say that: α is (not) φ-plausible (with respect to t) if r (φ (γ, t), φ (δ, t)) is (not) satisfied; α is (not) plausible (with respect to t) if r (φe (γ, t), φe (δ, t)) is (not) satisfied.
The relationship between plausibility and chunk quality is shown in Figure 7 . The vertical axis relates to the chunk quality and assumes that the two chunks are of comparable quality but, with that caveat, it shows some interesting zones marked A, B, C and D. (The vertical axis is only indicative since chunk quality is a partial order not a total order.) Zone A represents assertions that are most likely to be true (in an Ecosystem sense)-plausible and supported by high chunk quality. Zone C represents assertions that can be considered contradictionsthose that have a relation that does not correspond to a reliable (high quality) relation between the chunks. Zones B and D correspond to low chunk quality and are correspondingly unreliable. The dotted line shows increasing reliability of plausibility (or perhaps we should call it trustworthiness). Table 2 shows how orders for chunks can be extended to assertions. [t] denotes that precision is measured over all of the chunks in a group in the assertion. This measure is of relatively little value for assertions but will assume a greater importance when we consider passages below. Any assertion interpretation induces two chunk interpretations and, for the last two rows, the third column in the Table represents the corresponding chunk interpretations. The second order (≤aq, [t] ) measures the quality of the chunks in the assertion but still just works in the direction of the y-axis in Figure 7 . The final order (≤ai,[t]) measures the overall coverage and resolution of the chunks in the assertion.
None of these orders captures the impact of plausibility (for which the objective is to mimic the dotted line in Figure 7 ) so consider the following definitions: P = ΓαΜ × Φα × T; Pαt0 = {φ ∈ Φα: α is not φ-plausible (with respect to t)} and similarly Pαt1 for which α is φ-plausible; Pαt = Pαt0 ∪Pαt1. Then ≤ar,α[t] is a partial order that enables the comparison of the reliability of plausibility between different interpretations of the same assertion.
Measures for Boolean Passages
For Boolean passages, we can define another measure based on the number of assertions in the Boolean passage. Suppose β1 = f (α1i) is a passage and α1i = (γ1i, ρ1i, δ1i); β2 = f (α2j) is a passage and α2j = (γ2j, ρ2j, δ2j); then define β1 ≤na β2 if α1i ∈ {α2j for all j} for all i.
In this case β2 is constructed from a superset of the assertions in β1. Table 3 shows how we can use a similar approach to combine orders as for assertions. The table suggests that ≤pcov applies to Γβ, but how can this be if two Boolean passages are of different sizes? Strictly, ≤pcov applies to Γσ × … × Γσ but two projections map Γβ first to Γγ × … × Γγ then to Γσ × … × Γσ so we can apply ≤pcov to Γβ. Now suppose that β1, β2 are Boolean passages with β1 larger than β2 (in the sense that it contains more assertions) and β11 is the initial piece of β1 that corresponds to the size of β2. Then define ≤pcov for β1, β2 as follows:
if β11 ≥pcov β2 then β1 >pcov β2; if β11 <pcov β2 then β1 and β2 are not comparable; if β11 and β2 are not comparable then β1 and β2 are not comparable. Coverage increases with the number of chunks but quality decreases so the same idea applies in reverse to the quality-related orders. Define ≤pq,[t] for β1, β2 as follows:
β2 then β1 and β2 are not comparable; if β11 and β2 are not comparable then β1 and β2 are not comparable.
Finally, how does this apply to ≤pi,[t] and ≤pu,[t]?
In this case, coverage increases with the number of chunks but quality does not, so we need to restrict comparison to Boolean passages of the same size (in terms of assertions). This is denoted by the n suffix in the third column of Table 3 .
Plausibility can be extended similarly. Suppose that: , t) , ri, φ (δi, t)), where ri corresponds to ρi; then say that β is (not) φ-plausible (with respect to t) if f (ri (φ (γi, t), φ (δi, t))) is (not) satisfied; β is (not) plausible (with respect to t) if f (ri (φe (γi, t), φe (δi, t))) is (not) satisfied.
This definition of plausibility can be used to define the reliability of plausibility (or φ-plausibility, similarly) for Boolean passages in the same way as for assertions. Consider the following definitions: Q = ΓβΜ × Φβ × T; Qβt0 = {φ ∈ Φβ: β is not φ-plausible (with respect to t)} and similarly Qβt1;
For any fixed β, t, Qβt0 and Qβt1 are disjoint, so define ≤pr,β[t] as follows:
Then ≤pr,β[t] is a partial order that enables the comparison of the reliability of plausibility between elements of Qβt.
These orders are preorders not partial orders since anti-symmetry no longer applies.
Restricting Measures
A limitation of the approach described above is that the measures for accuracy, precision and resolution rely on the properties of interpretations for all chunks. If two interpretations vary in relative quality for different subsets of chunks then they will not be comparable. This corresponds, for example, to the situation in which two people have different areas of expertise.
This limitation is caused by the scope of the chunks. The measures apply only to a single Modelling Tool so we may decide that the different areas of expertise correspond to different, more specific, Modelling Tools. But, more generally, we can apply the measures to subsets of chunks so long as what remains is rich enough to support the ability to create Boolean passages. In this way we can create measures that focus in on specific areas of interest. Figure 8 summarises the relationship between some of the orders defined above. The Figure shows how basic measures (at the bottom) can be combined into measures like the reliability of plausibility and the useful amount of information. Timeliness may play a role depending on usage (this is discussed further in Section 5 below).
Summary of Orders
Truth and Truthlikeness
In [2] , Floridi reviews important questions in the Philosophy of Information and asks "can information explain truth"? He adds the following supplementary questions:
"Whether an informational theory could explain truth more satisfactorily than other current approaches" and "if that is answered in the negative, whether an informational approach could at least help to clarify the theoretical constraints to be satisfied by other approaches."
MfI allows truth to be examined from a number of different viewpoints and supplies some constraints (of the type that Floridi refers to). Truth is expressed using IAs and IAs are interpreted by IEs. So, truth (for an IE) is related to both an IA and its interpretation and the nature of truth cannot be disentangled from the quality of information. There are several implications of this.
First, interpretation may be unreliable. In Section 3 above, we discussed the difficulties that humans have in handling information because they are liable to psychological biases [8] . So we cannot wholly rely on our perceptions of truth. Now consider the geometry of information. The measures described above generally only support partial orders or preorders. This means that, overall, information cannot support many-valued logics [13] that assume that truth-values satisfy a total order.
Within an Ecosystem, the perception of truth is the result of Ecosystem conventions. This is consistent with [14] in which, according to Kuhn, even the most rigorous of human activities (science) relies on consensus in the relevant community. He discusses a paradigm in the following terms:
"I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of scientific practice-examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together-provide models from which spring coherent traditions of scientific research."
The "accepted examples" and "coherent traditions" he mentions correspond to Information Ecosystems.
The Ecosystem concept in MfI reinforces the view of [11, 15] that information is relative-that it relies on Ecosystem conventions at one level and the specific interpretation of an IE at the next. Indeed, within MfI, the interpretation of "truth", like that of all concepts, is Ecosystem-dependent, so we would expect different approaches to the subject of truth.
Popper [12] introduced an example of this when he suggested that a statement can be logically true but also falsifiable as a statement about the world. His example was "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples". The first interpretation ("logically true") relies on connections only using the conventions of the Modelling Tool (Mathematics in this case). In the terms of Figure 2 , the context is the IA only, the search space is Modelling Tool content only and the Modelling Tool only defines the success threshold. By contrast, the second interpretation allows a wider connection with events in the world. To make the same point another way, the first uses Mathematics as the Modelling Tool and the second uses both language and Mathematics and subjects the connection to a more rigorous connection assessment. The distinction between the two is a demonstration of the difference between pure Mathematics and science. But it also demonstrates that, if truth is concerned with reality in the physical world then conclusions reached on the basis of a limited connection strategy alone may well be unreliable.
For his example, it is easy to see that the interpretations coincide fairly readily. However if we consider the example "2 piles + 2 piles = 4 piles" then it is more difficult. The second form of interpretation depends on what "+" means since it is also possible that "2 piles + 2 piles = 1 pile" (or other numbers). In this case the quality of the assertion is reduced.
The subsequent sections develop the implications of the relativity of information for truth and truthlikeness. Truth corresponds to the reliability of plausibility and the discussion below shows that truthlikeness can also be explained using the same measure.
Measures of Information-Truth
Truth is expressed using information but, more specifically, using Boolean passages. What does this mean for "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth"? Truth itself is defined by the relevant Ecosystem interpretation and, in terms of the measures defined above, it corresponds to high reliability of plausibility (≤pr,β[t] ). This criterion corresponds to those used in different Ecosystems including, for example:
 the law-"beyond reasonable doubt";  science-for example, the six-sigma criterion used in particle physics experiments like the test for the Higgs boson.
As we find with these and other Ecosystems, it may not be possible to assess these tests without a robust connection strategy and reliable derivation. Truth may also be concerned with timeliness, depending on the usage. An interpretation may have been true at the time an IA was created but no longer true at the time of the interpretation. It is a matter of convention and usage whether the word "true" applies to the time of the creation of an IA, the time of its interpretation or some other time. But, if required, we can also include the timeliness order ≤tim or some variant of it.
The whole truth poses a new challenge-is there anything missing? The simple answer is that there always will be. It is impossible to capture the entire state of a slice-this is the "blind men and the elephant" point discussed, for example, in [16] . The whole truth is linked to the "amount of information" discussed below and so, for intrinsic IQ, the whole truth is impossible to achieve.
But we can analyse the whole truth in relation to action IQ. The main difference between intrinsic IQ and action IQ is that, in the latter case, it is possible (theoretically) to determine what is sufficient to resolve the possible alternatives. This is determined by coverage (is there enough "breadth" of information?) and resolution (how much is interpreted?) as well as the number of relations that need to be satisfied (the number of assertions). So we can use ≤pi2, [t] .
Finally, nothing but the truth requires that the Boolean passage does not include any chunks γ for which the interpretation is less γ-⊃-accurate than Ecosystem interpretation.
Measures of Information-Truthlikeness
Truthlikeness is discussed in [2] . In Section 5.1 we considered part of this question: to what extent can we compare interpretations of a Boolean passage with respect to reliability of plausibility. In this section we consider the extent to which Boolean passages can be truthlike and the extent to which can we define progressively truthlike Boolean passages.
A simple example first-suppose that a room contains 150 people. Then (assuming a reasonable interpretation):
(1) "the room contains 150 people" is plausible; (2) "the room contains about 150 people" is also plausible; (3) "the room contains 151 people" is implausible but close (in some sense).
In this case by varying the value of a single property we can change the interpretation of the assertion from implausible to plausible. In particular the coverage of the relevant chunk decreases from 1 to 2 and then increases again from 2 to 3.
We can generalise from this example using the concept of reliability of plausibility. If we relax and then tighten the degree of coverage then we may be able to trace a sequence from an implausible passage to a plausible passage so that the reliability of plausibility increases along the sequence. If this is possible then we can say that the degree of truthlikeness increases along the path. In this sense, reliability of plausibility becomes a measure of truthlikeness. We can formalise this in the following way. Consider the following definitions: P = ΓαΜ × Φα × T; pl: P → {0, 1} where "0" represents "not plausible" and "1" represents "plausible"; αi = (γ, ρ, δi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n where the δi correspond to values for a single property and Α = {αi}; Qt0 = {αi ∈ ΓαΜ: pl (αi, φe, t) = 0} and similarly Qt1; Qt = Qt0 ∪ Qt1.
Suppose Α' = {α'1, α'2, α'2}, Α' ⊆ Α and Α' has the following property:
Then the definition of Α' mirrors the technique in the above example. It may be possible to compare the proximity of assertions. Suppose that:
Then α is "closer" to reliable plausibility than α'1. And a corresponding statement applies if:
The reliability of plausibility order enables a comparison of different interpretations. The relaxation and tightening of coverage (as above) enables some pairs of assertions to be compared.
The Amount of Information
The amount of information is a measure that has caused difficulties. In both the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox (BCP) [3] and the scandal of deduction [4] , definitions of the amount of the amount of information have caused counter-intuitive results and different approaches have been taken to resolution (see, for example, the discussion in [2] ). In this section we apply the ideas developed throughout the paper and show that MfI provides a natural way to treat the amount of information.
In both cases, the discussion follows the same course. The BCP and scandal of deduction are both intuitively unsatisfactory because the previous definitions of the "amount" of information do not reflect the relativity and constraints of information. When these are added, using the definitions of measures of information above and the approach of MfI more generally, the paradox and scandal disappear.
The Bar-Hillel Carnap Paradox (BCP)
In [ Figure 8 shows some ways of treating the "amount of information". For chunks (using the order ≤ci,t), the amount of information relates to the degree to which the chunks constrain and how well the constraint is resolved in interpretation. Chunks can be combined into ever more constraining specifications. For assertions and Boolean passages it is also a question of volume-how many assertions form the Boolean passage (using the order ≤na). These can be combined for Boolean passages (in the order ≤pi2,[t]).
Because chunks can be defined in Modelling Tools independently of reality they can over-constrain with the result that interpretations map to the empty set. This is the MfI equivalent of a part of the BCP but it applies to chunks only, which cannot be contradictions (they are constraints, not statements about constraints), and in this case the quality of such a chunk (in terms of ≤cq,t) is low.
A contradiction is a Boolean passage that is implausible with high quality. This can never be the case for a Boolean passage containing an over-constrained chunk.
The amount of information is a term that combines measures of chunks, the number of assertions and interpretations. If we include quality we can consider the "useful" amount of information. The order ≤pu,[t] defined in Table 3 includes these elements (although it uses ≤pc rather than ≤pi2,[t] because resolution is already taken into account in ≤pq, [t] ).
So, using the tools of MfI, there is no paradox and we can refine the notion of the amount of information by including quality in a measure of the useful amount of information.
The Scandal of Deduction
In [17] D'Agostino describes the "scandal of deduction" as follows:
"According to the received view, logical deduction never increases (semantic) information. This tenet clashes with the intuitive idea that deductive arguments are useful just because, by their means, we obtain information that we did not possess before." This is discussed further in [18, 19] . When the scandal of deduction is viewed through the lens of MfI it prompts a number of questions including, for example, the following:
 "Logical deduction never increases (semantic) information"-for whom?  What does increased information mean?
Approaching the issue from an interpretation of an IA by an IE, we can frame the question in terms of MfI. Suppose that the following is true: "P IMPLIES Q" (we assume, here, that "true" means reliably plausible, as above, for a particular Ecosystem). Then we need to consider whether, under these circumstances, there is more information in P and Q than in P. More information can mean more information in an IA, more in the memory of an IE or a combination of the two. This means that there are a number of possibilities to consider.
There are shown in Table 4 that considers the options when an IE interprets an IA. In all cases the IA contains at least "P" and never contains "Q". The options numbered 1-8 in Table 4 are analysed below. The connection strategy determines how thorough the process of recognition is and the creativity, rigour and extent of processing determines the subsequent analysis. (We are assuming, for example, that the IE cannot prove "P IMPLIES Q" if it is not provided.) So, all we can say is that there are a number of possibilities depending on these two factors. But if we stick to the possibilities that arise naturally out of Modelling Tool processing then there are the following:
(a) the IE makes a connection with the content during recognition (depending on the connection strategy) but does not store the content in memory;
(b) the content is stored in memory as a result of recognition (as a by-product of the Modelling Tool processing, again depending on connection strategy);
(c) the content is stored in memory as a result of processing (again depending on the nature of the processing).
In each case, the amount of information may mean one or both of the following:
 the amount in the IA;  how much is added to the memory of the IE and, in particular, whether either or both of the following are added (assuming that "P" is added in each case):
o "P IMPLIES Q"; o "Q".
These possibilities, applied to the options contained in Table 4 , are shown in the columns of Table 5 . In the last two columns a, b, and c refer to the corresponding possibilities in the list above. 
